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Note
Embryo Adoption: The Solution to an Ambiguous
Intent Standard
Molly Miller*
In Prato-Morrison v. Doe, a married couple suspected that
the fertility clinic they used had implanted their unused frozen
embryos into a third party without their consent.' Though un-
successful in their own attempts to conceive, the Morrisons
suspected that another couple had twin girls using their em-
bryos.2 The Morrisons wanted to find out, via genetic testing, if
they were the biological parents of the twins, who were almost
fourteen years old at the time. 3 The court refused to allow the
testing, concluding that this would disrupt the twins' lives in a
manner that was not in their best interest.4 After the great ex-
pense of money and time the Morrisons invested in having a
child, they were left with no children and the belief that stran-
gers may be raising the children who were genetically related
to them.5
Faced with a similar situation in Robert B. v. Susan B., the
court allowed genetic testing,6 but still the conclusion was
wanting. Robert B. and his wife Denise learned that the fertili-
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thoughtful advice. She would like to thank the staff and editors of the Minne-
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Lange for their many gracious edits. Lastly, she thanks her parents, Bill and
Becky Miller, for providing a constant stream of encouragement, and her sibl-
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1. 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 510 (Ct. App. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 515.
5. See id. at 516 (affirming the denial of the Morrisons' request for bio-
logical testing).
6. 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 786 (Ct. App. 2003) ("[T]he trial court deter-




ty clinic they used to attempt to conceive possibly sold their
unused frozen embryos to Susan B. without their consent.7
Upon learning that Susan B. had a child, Daniel, as a result of
successful in vitro fertilization (IVF), Robert and Denise sought
a parentage action.8 Genetic testing revealed that Robert B.
was Daniel's biological father.9 Because Robert and Denise
used a donated ovum, on the other hand, Denise was not genet-
ically related to the child.10 The court found that Robert and
Susan were the legal parents of the child and refused to give
Denise standing to challenge Susan's maternity." Although
this Solomonic approach offered some vindication to Robert, it
left Denise with nothing. 12 The court relied heavily on biology
(Robert's genetics and Susan's gestation) in making its deci-
sion,13 even though Denise had invested much of her time and
money in creating the embryo that became Daniel.
Both Prato-Morrison and Robert B. evoke more questions
than answers. Unsettling outcomes are inevitable given the
sensitive subject matter of assisted reproduction. Potential par-
ents remove procreation from within the privacy of the home to
the public sphere of physicians, researchers, courts, and tech-
nology.14 Outsourcing baby making essentially turns it into a
business and invites the potential legal complications of the




10. Id.; see Kenneth Ofgang, CA Rejects Maternal Rights Claim Arising
from Clinic Mixup, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE, June 17, 2003, at 1,
available at http://www.metnews.comlarticles/robe061703.htm (reporting on
the court's finding that Denise was not Daniel's mother).
11. Robert B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790.
12. See id. (recognizing Robert and Susan as Daniel's parents, but not al-
lowing Denise to assert her maternity claim).
13. See id. at 786-87.
14. See Debora Spar & Anna M. Harrington, Building A Better Baby
Business, 10 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 41, 42-44, 69 (2009) (connecting the
public's hesitancy toward recognition of the market functions of artificial re-
production to its view that baby making is typically a private enterprise).
15. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988) (invalidating a
"surrogacy contract" on the ground of its unenforceability according to law and
public policy); cf. Prato-Morrison v. Doe, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 515 (Ct. App.
2002) (referencing the amount of money accepted by the Morrisons to resolve a
civil action against the fertility clinics that misused their genetic material).
See generally Carol Sanger, Developing Market in Baby-Making: In the Matter
of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67 (2007) (discussing the growing market
and business of baby making in the United States).
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child and on parenting creates a situation that is far more com-
plicated than the mistaken transfer of property or a broken
contract.16 Both of the above cases were the results of poor fer-
tility clinic practices. Without regulation, fertility clinics are
free to exchange and combine genetic material in whatever self-
regulated manner they choose.17 In a market where the product
is both monetarily priceless and emotionally invaluable,18 self-
regulation is risky.
Application of general contract and property law to em-
bryos is no longer appropriate once actual children are in-
volved-which is precisely when litigation surrounding embryo
donation is most likely to occur.' 9 Regulation of embryo dona-
tion is necessary to ensure that the expectations of all the par-
ties involved are clear, to avoid unethical and abusive practices
by fertility clinics, and to reduce the risk of litigation resulting
from embryo donations. 20 Regulations organized around paren-
tage, not around ownership or biology, can best meet the expec-
tations of persons involved in embryo creation and donation.
This Note suggests that the best way to achieve the above
goals is by importing a regulatory system similar to the adop-
tion system that already exists in many states to embryo dona-
tion. This is not the first time that commentators have made
this suggestion;21 however, the proposed solution is nuanced by
the argument that the purpose of the embryo "adoption" should
be to transfer the status of intended parent from the embryo's
creators to a third party. For this reason, in the realm of as-
16. Cf. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (rejecting a
property interest in embryos).
17. See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: How MONEY, SCIENCE,
AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 51 (2006) (noting that
"private rules reign" at fertility clinics).
18. See id. at 2, 32 (evaluating the market that emerges when demand is
limited only by ability to pay).
19. See Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 786 (Ct. App. 2003)
(litigating the parentage of a boy named Daniel); Prato-Morrison, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 510 (involving thirteen-year-old twins).
20. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 594 (App. Div. 1997) (Miller,
J., dissenting) ("The legal, emotional, and ethical nightmare ... demonstrates
the clear need for legislation. . . .").
21. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Inter-
pretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV.
835, 866 (2000) (suggesting a system analogous to adoption for embryo dona-
tion, with some exceptions); Janette M. Puskar, "Prenatal Adoption'" The Va-
tican's Proposal to the In Vitro Fertilization Disposition Dilemma, 14 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 757, 760, 776-77 (1998) (evaluating the papal suggestion
that embryo adoption be the sole embryo disposition method).
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sisted reproductive technology (ART), the role of intent becomes
particularly important.
Part I of this Note explains the embryo's current ambi-
guous legal status. This outline of existing case law and pro-
posed legislation sets up a framework for understanding the
role intent plays in parentage determinations generally. Specif-
ically, surrogacy cases set up a useful analogy for understand-
ing why an intent standard is the best way to determine paren-
tage in embryo donation. Part II argues that intent, rather
than biology or genetics, should be used to determine parentage
and that intent is established when an embryo is created. Part
III suggests that in order for a donor to donate an embryo to
anyone other than its creator, the status of intended parent
must also be transferred. A regulatory system that mimics the
current adoption system is best suited to transfer intent rather
than relying on privately negotiated contracts. Part III also ad-
dresses some of the critiques of this solution and offers a gener-
al suggestion for reform of current uniform legislation as it ex-
ists in the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)22 and the Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology (MAGART).23
I. LEGAL AMBIGUITY-THE EMBRYO, THE PARENT,
AND INTENT
Collaborative reproduction, especially embryo donation,
can involve a large number of players. There may be an egg do-
nor and a sperm donor whose genetic material is used to create
an embryo, one or two embryo donors who originally facilitate
the creation of the embryo for their own use, one or two people
who receive the donated embryo, and possibly a gestational
surrogate who agrees to have the embryo implanted into her
uterus and carry it to term. 24 At the very least, there are two
donors who are both genetically related to the embryo and at
least one person who receives the embryo for his or her own ar-
tificial reproductive use.25 While there is growing legal dis-
course on all of these potential relationships and parentage is-
22. Cf. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 4 (Supp. 2009);
id., 9B U.L.A. 295 (2001).
23. Cf. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 101 (2008),
available at http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf.
24. See Garrison, supra note 21, at 849.
25. See id. (discussing the different parenting possibilities created by
IVF).
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sues,26 there is still relatively little discussion about the rela-
tionship between an embryo donor and those receiving the
embryo. 27
Embryo donation rarely arises in case law-probably due
to its limited use and typically willing parties. 28 Most state and
proposed uniform legislation completely ignores the practice.29
When handled properly, embryo donation under the current
self-imposed rules put in place by fertility clinics seems to
work, as evidenced by the small number of cases litigating
embryo donation. 30 However, as the use of reproductive tech-
nologies and embryo donation increases, problems are inevita-
ble.
The following discussion of the legal status of the embryo,
as well as who should be the "parents"31 of a donated embryo,
provides a basis for evaluating the need for a consistently ap-
plicable standard for determining parentage. Though there is
little case law or legislation specifically addressing parentage of
donated embryos, courts have developed models for determin-
ing parentage in surrogacy cases. These models are instructive
26. See id. at 840 ("There is a wealth of popular and scholarly literature
dealing with the ethical, legal, medical, and human issues arising from
[IVF]."). See generally id. (discussing the myriad of relationships implicated in
assisted reproductive technology (ART) and suggesting analogous legal sys-
tems be used to govern these relationships and the issues that arise around
them).
27. For example, a search of the term "surrogacy" in Westlaw's Journals
and Law Reviews database results in 2388 sources, while searching for the
terms "embryo adoption" or "embryo donation" only renders 358 results
(search last conducted Dec. 7, 2009).
28. See Aaron Zitner, A Cold War on Embryo Adoptions, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
22, 2002, at Al (detailing the process of embryo adoption and the considera-
tions made both by embryo-donating and embryo-receiving couples); RAND
INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE & RAND HEALTH, How MANY FROZEN EMBRYOS ARE
AVAILABLE FOR RESEARCH? 1 (2003), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research-briefs/
RB9038/RB9038.pdf (finding that only 2.3% of all frozen embryos are desig-
nated for donation).
29. See, e.g., MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102
(2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf
(failing to address parentage in embryo donation or adoption); UNIF. PAREN-
TAGE ACT § 102 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 11-12 (Supp. 2009) (same).
30. See generally Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 788-90 (Ct.
App. 2003) (relying on cases that, with the exception of Prato-Morrison, do not
involve embryo donation); Prato-Morrison v. Doe, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 514-
16 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing cases that do not involve embryo donation).
31. For the purposes of this Note, the term "parent" means the party or
parties that have a legally cognizable right to a parent-child relationship with
any child born as a result of successful embryo implantation.
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when attempting to determine the parentage of a child born as
a result of embryo donation.
A. THE EMBRYO'S STATUS
The embryo, or more accurately the preembryo, 32 is a four-
to-eight-cell zygote with a unique genome. 33 At this stage, the
cells are undifferentiated and each has the capacity for develop-
ing into any cell in the human body and even separate individ-
uals (clones). 34 It is at this stage of in vitro fertilization (IVF)
that a doctor would implant the embryos into a woman's ute-
rus.35 Usually, for the purposes of IVF, more embryos are
created than will be immediately implanted.36 Remaining em-
bryos are then frozen for storage, destroyed, or used for scien-
tific research.37 Based on a study conducted in 2002, there were
almost 400,000 embryos frozen in storage. 38
The legal status of the embryo is ambiguous. With the ex-
ception of Louisiana, 39 no state has recognized an embryo as an
individual with legally enforceable rights.40 If the law recog-
nized an embryo as a person and gave it individual rights, emb-
ryo donation would require adoption and full relinquishment of
parental rights. 41 In fact, one of the strongest points of opposi-
32. This Note uses the terms embryo and preembryo interchangeably.
33. See John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early
Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 441 (1990).
34. See Francis J. Beckwith, Must Theology Always Sit in the Back of the
Secular Bus?: The Federal Courts' View of Religion and Its Status as Know-
ledge, 24 J.L. & RELIGION 547, 565 (2008) (defining undifferentiated cells as
"totipotent," which means that the cells "have the capacity to develop into any
organ"); Gregory Dolin, M.D., A Defense of Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 84
IND. L.J. 1203, 1208 (2009) (discussing undifferentiated cells' capacity to de-
velop into a fully adult organism or any cell in the organism).
35. See Robertson, supra note 33, at 443.
36. See Katheryn D. Katz, The Legal Status of the Ex Utero Embryo: Im-
plications for Adoption Law, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 303, 303 (2006) ("[M]ore em-
bryos are created than can safely be transferred to the woman's body for im-
plantation . . . .").
37. See id. at 304.
38. See RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE & RAND HEALTH, supra note 28,
at 1.
39. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (2008) (giving a human embryo the
legal status of a person).
40. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590 n.1 (Tenn. 1992) (noting that
at the time of trial only one state had enacted legislation that recognized an
embryo as having legally enforceable rights as an individual).
41. See Katz, supra note 36, at 337 ("If embryos are persons, then logic
dictates that adoption law with all of its regulations and restrictions should
govern the process of embryo donation.").
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tion on the question of embryo adoption versus donation is the
fear that the embryo will be recognized as a person, thus impli-
cating a host of abortion and embryonic stem-cell research is-
sues. 42
Despite their lack of rights, embryos occupy a unique legal
sphere somewhere between property and personhood. When
addressing issues concerning embryos, courts tend to apply a
combination of property, contract, and family law. 4 3 The status
of embryos typically becomes important in disputes between
embryo creators where the parties disagree as to the disposi-
tion of the embryo.44 Courts tend to agree that contracts con-
cerning the disposition of the embryo are enforceable unless
one of the parties changes his or her mind at any time up to de-
struction or implantation of the embryo.45 This rationale is
based on the privacy rights that surround procreation and is of-
ten identified as an interest in "avoiding procreation" tied up
with procreational autonomy. 46 While some commentators sug-
gest that the qualified recognition of contracts ultimately
equates to property law,4 7 the courts' willingness to overlook
the contract 48 and base their decisions on a balancing test of
42. See id. at 333-34 ("If the ex utero embryo is recognized as a person,
the most powerful effect would be as an entering wedge in the fight against
legal abortion.").
43. See, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 ("We conclude that preembryos are
not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim cat-
egory that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human
life.").
44. See, e.g., id. at 598 (analyzing the disposition of an embryo where the
divorcing parties had neither an express nor implied contract as to its disposi-
tion).
45. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 782-83 (Iowa
2003) (holding that public policy prohibits the enforcement of a contract for the
disposition of unused embryos when one of the parties changes his or her
mind). But cf. id. at 782 ("[W]e think judicial enforcement of an agreement be-
tween a couple regarding their future family and reproductive choices would be
against the public policy of this state. Our decision should not be construed,
however, to mean that disposition agreements between donors and fertility
clinics have no validity at all.").
46. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602 n.26.
47. See Katz, supra note 36, at 315-16 ("Despite paying lip service to the
notion of special respect, in reality courts treat the embryo as the property of
its progenitors.").
48. See In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 782 (rejecting the contractual agree-
ment and holding that a contract in this realm is subject to the right of either
party to change its mind after the initial agreement).
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each contributor's rightS49 intimate that the interest one has in
an embryo is greater than a property interest. Though courts
have been clear that they do not intend to give the embryo it-
self rights,50 the unique legal status of the embryo creates a
distinctive interest for its creators.
The difference between egg or sperm donors and embryo
donors further supports an embryo donor's special interest in
his or her embryo. The primary difference is that people who
provide their egg or sperm do not intend to parent any result-
ing children.51 By contrast, people who create embryos have
every intention of parenting any resulting children. Because
embryo creators intentionally create more embryos than they
might use in a single IVF cycle, they sometimes donate some of
their embryos to other hopeful parents.5 2 Nevertheless, the
primary intent of embryo creators is to use those embryos for
their own artificial reproduction.53 This is generally supported
by the contracts most parties sign concerning the disposition of
unused embryos. 54 But as their needs change, so does their in-
tent concerning each embryo. The extent to which donor intent
determines the parentage of a future child is therefore of par-
ticular importance.
B. THE INTENDED PARENT
The scarcity of case law or legislation on embryo donation
offers little guidance in determining parentage. By refusing to
allow genetic testing in Prato-Morrison, the court refrained
49. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (employing a balancing test when no
contract exists concerning disposition of unused embryos).
50. See, e.g., id. at 597 (refusing to characterize preembryos as either per-
sons or property).
51. See Sarah Terman, Note, Marketing Motherhood: Rights and Respon-
sibilities of Egg Donors in Assisted Reproductive Technology Agreements, 3
Nw. U. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 167, 172 (2008) (discussing the practice of assuring
egg providers that their participation will terminate upon the extraction of
their eggs).
52. See Karin A. Moore, Embryo Adoption: The Legal and Moral Chal-
lenges, 1 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 100, 104-05 (2007) (explaining how
cryopreservation creates the possibility of leftover embryos).
53. RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE & RAND HEALTH, supra note 28, at 2
(finding that 88.2% of frozen embryos have been designated for family-
building).
54. See Natalie R. Walz, Abandoned Frozen Embryos and Embryonic Stem
Cell Research: Should There Be a Connection?, 1 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 122, 123 (2007) (stating that couples often agree to the disposition of lef-
tover embryos in a contract).
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from addressing parentage.55 In Robert B., the court looked
strictly at biology. It nullified the "donation" that Susan, the
gestational mother, believed she had received; forced Robert,
the genetic father, to raise his child alongside a complete
stranger; and denied Denise, Robert's wife and one of the emb-
ryo's creators, recognition as the child's mother.56 None of the
parties got what they bargained for. Nonetheless, as embryo
donation becomes more frequent57 and more litigation emerges,
judges will likely take a piecemeal approach, based on common
law and existing statutes, to resolving these cases.58
Surrogacy cases provide a parallel for discussing possible
parentage issues in embryo donation. Courts typically employ
one or more of three possible means of determining parentage
in surrogacy disputes: genetics,59 gestation, 60 and intent.61
Judicial determination is usually predicated on statutory lan-
guage; however, statutes often create loopholes for surrogacy
issues by which parentage can be established either by gesta-
tion or genetics.62
State parentage statutes are often based on the original
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) adopted in 1973, which aimed to
remedy the illegitimacy of children born to unmarried women
by extending parentage to fathers regardless of marital sta-
tus.6 3 However, when applied to women, determining parentage
55. See Prato-Morrison v. Doe, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 515 (Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that the alleged genetic mother lacked standing to pursue parentage
action and therefore declining to decide parentage).
56. See Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 785-86 (Ct. App.
2003).
57. See SPAR, supra note 17, at 90-91 (noting that, due to the high de-
mand for reproductive technology and the comparatively low cost for embryo
donation, a market for embryo donation among the middle class is likely to
expand).
58. See Prato-Morrison, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516 n.10 ("Whatever merit
there may be to a fact-driven case-by-case resolution of each new issue, some
overall legislative guidelines would allow the participants to make informed
choices and the courts to strive for uniformity in their decisions.").
59. See, e.g., Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 64-65 (Ct. C.P. 2004).
60. See, e.g., In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 730 (Tenn. 2005).
61. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 289 (Ct.
App. 1998).
62. See In re C.KG., 173 S.W.3d at 726 (recognizing the gap statutes
create by assuming the gestating woman is the mother in situations where a
surrogate is used); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781-82 (Cal. 1993) (find-
ing that application of state statutes could result in legal declaration of mo-
therhood to either of two women, one by virtue of her gestation of the child
and the other by her genetic relationship to the child).
63. See NA'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, SUMMARY:
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by genetics creates a statutory void in surrogacy issues, 64 and
potentially in embryo donation issues. A recurring complaint in
cases surrounding embryos and surrogacy is the lack of directly
applicable legislation.65 Reliance on these outdated uniform
laws forces courts to apply rules that do not consider all of the
emerging issues of artificial reproductive technologies (ART).66
Revisions of the UPA in 2000 specifically addressed paren-
tage of children resulting from ART.67 In particular, the UPA
defines the "intended parent" and applies the intent standard
to surrogacy agreements,6 8 but does not address embryo dona-
tion or embryo adoption. In 2008, the American Bar Association
published the Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive
Technology (MAGART).69 This Act briefly discusses the issue of
embryo donation, but limits its discussion to providing donation
as one of the options for disposition of unused embryos.70 Like
UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact summaries/
uniformacts-s-upa.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2009) (explaining that the original
UPA extended the parent-child relationship without regard to marital status
and crafted a "modern civil paternity action in which the sole issue was identi-
fying the natural father of any child"); see also Johnson, 851 P.2d. at 778-79
(noting that the Uniform Parentage Act was enacted in California in 1975
with the goal of eliminating the legal distinction between legitimate and ille-
gitimate children").
64. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (noting the failure of California statutes
to resolve the conflict between genetic and gestational bases for maternal
rights).
65. See In re C.KG., 173 S.W.3d at 730 ("Given the far-reaching, pro-
foundly complex, and competing public policy considerations necessarily impli-
cated by the present controversy, we conclude that crafting a general rule to
adjudicate all controversies so implicated is more appropriately accomplished
by the Tennessee General Assembly.").
66. See Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 60 (Ct. C.P. 1994) ("It is ap-
parent that the law must adapt and change to end the confusion caused by
surrogacy.").
67. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 701-809 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 354-70
(2001) (addressing assisted reproduction in article 7 and gestational agree-
ments, or surrogacy, in article 8); see also id. §§ 701-809, 9B U.L.A. 61-77
(Supp. 2009) (amending the 2000 version of the UPA and discussing the varia-
tions of the official text that some states have enacted).
68. See id. § 102(12), 9B U.L.A. 304 (2001) (defining "intended parents");
id. § 801(a)(3), 9B U.L.A. 362 (2001) (authorizing a "gestational agreement"
whereby the intended parents may agree to become the parents of a donor's or
gestational mother's child). But see id. § 102, 9B U.L.A. 11-12 (Supp. 2009)
(amending the Uniform Parentage Act to omit the definition of "intended par-
ent," although the term does appear in § 801(a)(3) of the amended version of
the UPA).
69. Cf. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. (2008), availa-
ble at http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf.
70. See id. § 203(1)(c).
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the UPA, this Act fails to address parentage for donated em-
bryos.
Genetics determined parentage in Belsito v. Clark, where
the intended parents wanted an order placing their names on
the birth certificate of their genetic child who was carried to
term by the intended mother's sister. 71 In declaring this couple
the child's parents, the court based its decision on the protec-
tion of a genetic parent's right to consent to procreate. 72 Be-
cause the genetic parents did not intend for the surrogate to
become the legal parent of the child, the court held that they
should not lose their right to parent the resulting child.73 The
shortcoming of this test is that often only one or neither of the
intended parents is biologically related to the child. 74 In such
cases, the child would be left with no parents, since egg and
sperm donors are often anonymous.75
Without proffering a formal standard, the Belsito court also
relied on the fact that the surrogate did not wish to parent the
child.76 Under this narrow holding, it is likely that the court
implicitly intended a genetic test to apply only in situations
where the intended parents are both genetic contributors to the
embryo.
A genetics-based decision relies on a biological connection
with the child. Sometimes the gestational mother is the in-
tended parent but has no genetic connection to the child. In
such cases, gestation, not genetics, provides the biological con-
nection on which courts can rely to determine parentage. In In
re C.KG., a couple used the intended father's sperm to fertilize
a donated egg, which was then implanted in the uterus of the
intended mother, who gave birth to triplets.77 When the
couple's relationship dissolved and a custody battle ensued over
the triplets, the court refused to base its parentage decision
71. 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 58, 66 (Ct. C.P. 1994).
72. See id. at 63-64 (arguing that the right to consent to procreate is fun-
damental and must be protected by the law).
73. See id. at 64-65 ("The test to identify the natural parents should be,
'Who are the genetic parents?').
74. See In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 726 (Tenn. 2005) ("In the event that
a dispute were to arise between an intended mother who had obtained eggs
from a third-party donor and a gestational surrogate in whom the eggs had
been implanted, the genetic test would implicitly invalidate any surrogacy
agreement.").
75. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 289 (Ct. App.
1998) (arguing that a biological test results in "legal parentlessness").
76. See Belsito, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d at 65.
77. 173 S.W.3d at 717-18.
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strictly on genetics. 78 Instead, it surveyed a variety of factors:
the intended mother's gestation of the children, her former
husband's original intent that she be the triplets' mother, and
the fact that the genetic mother did not want custody.79
The holdings in C.K.G. and Belsito apply to situations in
which the intended mother is biologically connected to the emb-
ryo that results in a child. In Belsito, the intended mother con-
tributed genetic material to the embryo.80 In C.KG., the in-
tended mother gestated and gave birth to the children.81 The
problem with a biology-based determination of parentage is
that many situations may arise in which the intended mother
is neither genetically nor gestationally connected to the result-
ing child. In such cases, this woman would never be recognized
as the child's parent. These surrogacy cases highlight the gaps
that begin to form when applying a biological standard to pa-
rentage.
The intent approach, however, fills in this gap, as demon-
strated in In re Marriage of Buzzanca. The court in Buzzanca
found that a husband and wife who facilitated the creation of
an embryo and arranged for a surrogate to carry the child to
term, but were not biologically related to the child, were none-
theless the legal parents of the resulting child.82 The court re-
lied heavily on the language that the California legislature em-
ployed in its enactment of the original UPA.83 The statute said
that gestation or genetics "may" establish parentage but did
not say that it must.8 4 This language gave the court room to
recognize a third way of determining parentage: intent.85
Unfortunately, courts applying the intent standard are not
entirely clear as to when intent is established. In Johnson v.
Calvert, the court found that when gestation and genetics do
78. See id. at 727-28 ("In cases such as this one, where a woman has be-
come intimately involved in the procreation process even though she has not
contributed genetic material, factors other than genetics take on special signi-
ficance.").
79. Id. at 730.
80. See Belsito, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d at 63-64.
81. See In re C.KG., 173 S.W.2d at 730.
82. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App.
1998) ("Even though neither [the intended mother nor the intended father] are
biologically related to [the child], they are still her lawful parents given their
initiating role as the intended parents in her conception and birth.").
83. See id. at 284 (noting that California's adoption of the UPA controlled
the parentage issue).
84. Id.
85. See id. at 293.
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not reside in the same woman, the nongestational woman's in-
tent to procreate a child, bring about its birth, and raise it
makes her its legal parent.86 The court noted that the couple
and the surrogate consented to the surrogacy agreement before
the in vitro process began,87 but it did not indicate how their in-
tent would be affected if the embryo were created before the
surrogate was identified.88 In Buzzanca, the court curtly stated
that the child "never would have been born had not [the in-
tended parents] both agreed to have a fertilized egg implanted
in a surrogate."89 The court analogized the determination of
maternal parentage to cases in which a man who consents to
artificial insemination of his wife by another man's sperm is
still considered the legal parent of the resulting child.90 In both
Buzzanca and Johnson, the courts recognized that intent to be
a parent was established by consent to and initiation of a medi-
cal procedure for procreation of a child.91
The two major criticisms of the intent test are its ambigui-
ty and the opportunity it creates for unmonitored adoption. 92
Ambiguity may arise when both the surrogate and the person
facilitating the embryo creation intend (or claim to intend) to
parent the resulting child. 93 Unmonitored adoption could occur
if only the surrogate intended to parent the child and the crea-
tors of the embryo did not.94 As the law stands these may or
may not be valid concerns, but an adoption-based system would
alleviate these concerns if applied to embryo donation.
II. THE INTENDED PARENT AND EMBRYO DONATION
An intent standard is the best method for determining pa-
rentage in embryo donation because it remedies the shortcom-
ings of the two biological tests of genetics and gestation. More
broadly, it provides a uniform standard that can be applied to
86. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding that
when the woman who gives birth to a child is not the woman who provided its
genetic material, "she who intended to procreate the child ... is the natural
mother under California law").
87. See id. at 784.
88. Cf. id. (failing to address to what degree intent can be separated from
the contract, but concluding that intent determines parentage).
89. In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 293; Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
92. See Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 61-62 (Ct. C.P. 1994).




all parentage issues associated with assisted reproduction.
Having an umbrella-like standard for these issues acknowledg-
es the fact that assisted reproduction is collaborative; the par-
ties involved and their roles are not consistent and vary with
the particular needs of each situation. Further, there is a foun-
dation for using an intent standard within emerging case law
and uniform laws. This is not to say that an intent standard, as
it functions in current case law and proposed legislation, is
readily applicable to embryo donation. Intent should be consi-
dered throughout the ART process and its fluidity should also
be recognized so as to make it more germane to embryo dona-
tion.
A. DETERMINING PARENTAGE BY BIOLOGY IS INAPPLICABLE TO
EMBRYO DONATION
For the purposes of embryo donation, determining paren-
tage strictly through biology simply will not work because do-
nees are never genetically related to the embryos they receive
and consequently would never be found to be parents. 95 While
gestation protects a woman who receives an embryo and has it
implanted in her uterus, it would not protect a couple who ob-
tained an embryo and then hired a surrogate.96
Additionally, gestation only determines parentage for the
mother, which could end up melding families in ways not in-
tended by the donors or donees. Such was the case in Robert B.
where the court recognized Robert, the genetic father of the
child, as the legal father and Susan as the legal mother by vir-
tue of her gestation.97 This pair was inadvertently bound by the
court through "their" child, while neither person's spouse had
any claim to the child.98
Further, the biology-based standards do not protect embryo
creators from having their embryos stolen and implanted with-
out their consent.99 In contrast, an intent standard would over-
95. See In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289 (arguing that a biological
test results in "legal parentlessness").
96. See id. at 283 (noting the trial judge's partial reliance on the fact that
the embryo creator was not the gestational mother to find that she was not the
legal mother).
97. See Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 785 (Ct. App. 2003).
98. See id. (denying Denise, Robert's wife, standing to pursue her paren-
tage claim and failing to mention whether Susan had a spouse or what his role
was in this process).




come the barriers that biology imposes by being more broadly
applicable.
B. AN INTENT STANDARD WOULD APPLY UNIFORMLY TO
SURROGACY AND OTHER ART PRACTICES
Applying an intent standard would create uniformity by
identifying the greatest number of biological combinations
within a single standard. Surrogacy and embryo donation are
essentially mirror images of the same practice.oo A standard
that explicitly recognizes genetics as determinative of paren-
tage will always bar embryo donation and will not always be
effective in surrogacy situations. 101 In fact, a child could be left
totally parentless.102 A standard based entirely on gestation
will always result in the child having a mother, but will never
protect surrogacy agreements. 103 Additionally, gestation will
not determine a father.104 Intent, in contrast, is not tied to biol-
ogy and allows collaborative reproduction to function. The very
goal of artificial reproduction is to circumvent the biological
process, so it is appropriate that biology be removed from the
parentage equation.
100. See SPAR, supra note 17, at 90 ("The only real difference [between
embryo donation and surrogacy] was subtle but huge: in embryo adoption, the
birth mother-the woman who was bearing another's genetic child-was now
legally and socially the 'real' mother. The surrogate, in other words, had be-
come the real thing.").
101. See Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 66 (Ct. C.P. 1994) (holding
that if the "individuals who have been identified as the genetic parents have
not relinquished or waived their rights to assume the legal status of natural
parents, they shall be considered the natural and legal parents of that child," a
rule that would unsatisfactorily resolve a Robert B.-like situation in which the
embryo creators did not waive their rights, but the woman in whom it was im-
planted believed that they had).
102. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 289 (Ct. App.
1998) (arguing that a biological test results in "legal parentlessness").
103. A gestational mother will always be identifiable because technology
still prevents children from developing entirely outside of the womb. Inherent
in the concept of surrogacy is that the intended mother does not carry the
child. If gestation were the only factor considered, the woman who gave birth
to the child would always trump the intended mother.
104. Technology has not advanced such that men are able to carry and give
birth to children. See, e.g., In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig.,
479 F.3d 936, 945 (8th Cir. 2007) (Bye, J., dissenting) ("[W]omen are the only
gender which can become pregnant.").
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C. UNIFORM LAWS ARE READILY ADAPTABLE TO INCLUDE AN
INTENT STANDARD FOR EMBRYO DONATION
Though they fail to address embryo donation, the most re-
cent legislative guides have suggested that the intended parent
be recognized for the purposes of surrogacy. 05 The definitions
used for "intended parent" in both the UPA and the MAGART
could apply to embryo donation. 06 The UPA defines intended
parents as "individuals who enter into an agreement providing
that they will be the parents of a child born to a gestational
mother by means of assisted reproduction, whether or not ei-
ther of them has a genetic relationship with the child."107 This
definition is specifically tailored toward surrogacy, 08 but it re-
cognizes a parental interest in individuals before a child is born
based on their intention to parent that child after its birth.109
An expansive reading of the definition could include anyone
who signs a contract with a fertility clinic for IVF. Specifically
extending this conclusion to embryo donation, the gestational
mother, who is also the embryo donee, would be the intended
parent.
The MAGART provides a broader definition of an intended
parent that can more easily be extended to embryo donation:
"'[i]ntended parent' is an individual, married or unmarried,
who manifests the intent as provided in this Act to be legally
bound as the parent of a child resulting from assisted or colla-
105. See, e.g., MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. alternative
B, § 701(2)(a) (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/
artmodelact.pdf ("The intended parents shall be the parents of the child for
purposes of State law immediately upon the birth of the child."); UNIF. PAREN-
TAGE ACT § 807 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 69 (Supp. 2009) (requiring the
court to confirm the intended parents as the parents of a child upon a vali-
dated gestational agreement).
106. See MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(19)
(2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf;
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(12) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 304 (2001). But
see id. § 102, 9B U.L.A. 11-12 (Supp. 2009) (amending the Uniform Parentage
Act to omit the definition of "intended parent," although the term does appear
in § 801(a)(3) of the amended version of the UPA).
107. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(12) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 304
(2001).
108. See id. §§ 801-809, 9B U.L.A. 362-69 (2001) (distinguishing the "in-
tended parents" of a child born as a result of a gestational agreement from a
"gestational mother," previously referred to as a "surrogate mother"); see also
id. §§ 801-809, 9B U.L.A. 69-77 (Supp. 2009) (adding to and amending the
original version of the UPA).
109. See id., 9B U.L.A. 304 (2001).
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borative reproduction."o10 There is no absolute definition of in-
tent in the MAGART,111 but in the section addressing the dona-
tion of unused embryos, the 1VIAGART refers to donors as in-
tended parents. 112
These recent changes to uniform legislation show a move-
ment toward a more expansive view of parentage in light of
ART and begin to contemplate the role of intent in ART situa-
tions. Building on this existing uniform legislation to better de-
fine intent is the first step to creating a workable intent stan-
dard for parentage.
D. CLARIFYING THE FORMATION OF INTENT
None of these standards explicitly addresses when intent is
formed.113 In surrogacy, intent seems to be recognized through
contracts,114 though there is some language in case law that
implies it may be formed earlier."15 Applying the MAGART
suggests that it is possible to exercise intent earlier since do-
nors are intended parents.
For the purposes of embryo donation, intent should be rec-
ognized when the embryo is created. Embryo creators, regard-
less of their genetic relation to the embryo, have the greatest
interest in that embryo because of the ambiguous status society
and the law place on embryos. 1 e Genetically speaking, the
embryo is an individual apart from the genetic material used to
create it.117 For this reason, an egg or sperm donor should not
automatically have a parentage claim. The embryo is no longer
110. See MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(19)
(2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf.
111. See id. (defining the procedure for manifesting intent broadly).
112. See id. § 502 ("Intended parents may choose to donate their unused
embryos .... ).
113. See, e.g., id. § 102(19) (requiring the manifestation of intent, but fail-
ing to explain how intent is manifested).
114. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) ("In deciding the is-
sue of maternity under the [California Uniform Parentage] Act we have felt
free to take into account the parties' intentions, as expressed in the surrogacy
contract, because in our view the agreement is not, on its face, inconsistent
with public policy.").
115. See id. (citing commentators who suggest that the idea of creating a
child manifests intent as it controls the eventual creation of the child).
116. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) ("We con-
clude that preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or 'property,'
but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of
their potential for human life.").
117. See Robertson, supra note 33, at 441.
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uniquely theirs. Additionally, an egg donor or sperm donor, by
definition, never intends to parent a child and, therefore, does
not have the intent necessary to be considered an intended par-
ent.118 Embryo donors, however, do intend to parent the em-
bryos they create to the extent that they desire children. 119 If
they did not intend to have children, they would not have
created the embryos. To the extent that someone allows their
genetic material to be used to create an embryo that they in-
tend to donate, they are actually egg or sperm donors. Given
that embryos are not bought or sold,120 there is no present
market for people to create embryos, with their own genetic
material or that of others, for the purpose of giving them to
someone else.
Embryo creation is also a clearly definable moment at
which intent can be established. For the intent standard to
function effectively, intent should be manifested in a legally
cognizable manner. Parentage cannot reliably be decided based
on what people want to happen. Several people can "intend" to
be parents-in fact, this is the source of much parentage litiga-
tion.121
One of the primary reasons for regulating embryo donation
is to prevent this sort of litigation. Once a child is born the pri-
mary concern of the court is protecting that child's best inter-
est.122 Custody disputes can be lengthy and prevent consistency
and permanency in a child's life, neither of which is consistent
with the child's best interest.123
118. See MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(9) (2008),
available at http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf (exclud-
ing "intended parents" from the definition of the term "donor").
119. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
120. See SPAR, supra note 17, at 91 ("Donors clearly are not selling their
embryos; they are giving them to other parents . . . ."). Although embryos are
not currently being bought or sold, it is important to remember that other as-
sisted-reproduction materials (such as sperm for artificial insemination, eggs
for IVF, and wombs for surrogacy) were also not bought or sold in the early
stages of the development of assisted reproductive technology. See id. The
transition from donation to transaction of embryos may only be a matter of
time.
121. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (challeng-
ing a surrogate's decision to keep the child she was carrying despite a contract
stating that she would give the child to the intended parents when it was
born).
122. See Prato-Morrison v. Doe, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 511 (Ct. App. 2002)
("[T]he best interests of the children dictate the result reached by the trial
court.").
123. See Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 63 (Ct. C.P. 1994) (noting
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Preventing damaging litigation is also a goal of uniform
legislation. 124 In its prefatory note, the MAGART addresses the
child's interest directly: "[i]t is the purpose of this Act to give
assisted reproductive technology (ART) patients, participants,
parents, providers, and the resulting children and their siblings
clear legal rights, obligations and protections."12 5 In order to
prevent litigation, legally recognized intent must be established
by a readily identifiable action. Embryo creation is a clear and
unmistakable moment when intent can be identified. If one
waits until a surrogacy agreement or a contract to transfer an
embryo is signed, parties can argue the contract is void, an ar-
gument that is recognized by courts.126
III. APPLYING THE INTENT STANDARD TO EMBRYO
DONATION
Embryo creators have a special interest in their embryos.
Recognizing the intended parent relationship between an emb-
ryo and its creators reflects the embryo's ambiguous status be-
tween life and property.127 The intended parent should have
the same rights as any embryo creator. He or she should be
able to control the embryo's disposition,128 make contracts with
fertility service providers,129 and enjoy a presumption of pa-
renthood of any child that results from the implantation of the
embryo.130 Recognizing the intended parent at the time of the
embryo's creation provides a clear guideline for parentage is-
that stability and finality in the parent-child relationship are in the child's
best interest).
124. See John J. Sampson, Uniform Family Laws and Model Acts, 42 FAM.
L.Q. 673, 677 (2008) (suggesting that uniform legislation reduces litigation).
125. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. prefatory note
(2008) (emphasis added), available at http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/
artmodelact.pdf.
126. See, e.g., Belsito, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d at 62 (holding that public policy will
not allow the state to enforce or encourage private agreements or contracts to
give up parental rights).
127. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (explaining
that preembryos are neither persons nor property).
128. See, e.g., MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 501(1)(a),
available at http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf (requir-
ing that embryo agreements provide for the intended use and disposition of
embryos).
129. See, e.g., id. § 501(1)(c) (requiring that embryo agreements have condi-
tions under which embryos will be abandoned at fertility clinics).
130. See, e.g., id. § 603 ("An individual who provides gametes for, or con-
sents to, assisted reproduction by a woman . .. with the intent to be a parent
of her child is a parent of the resulting child.").
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sues. Intent would not be a feeling or emotion, but rather a
manifestation of an interest that arises at the time an embryo
is created.131 In the context of embryo donation, the intended
parental interest would have to be transferred to those receiv-
ing the embryo in order for there to be a presumption of paren-
tage on the part of the recipient.
A. PRESUMPTION OF PARENTAGE THROUGH INTENT IS
DESIRABLE
Parentage determination is an inherent goal of embryo do-
nation. Whoever receives the embryo wants to know that they
will be the resulting child's legal parents. Establishing this be-
fore the child's birth is of the utmost importance because once a
child is born, its best interest is the primary concern of the
court, as evidenced in both Prato-Morrison1 32 and Robert B. 133
How does one best pursue this goal before the child's birth in
order to avoid unnecessary litigation that is both potentially
harmful to the child and costly to the relevant parties? The ul-
timate goal of embryo donation is the birth of a child, yet simp-
ly applying the child's best interest standard to an embryo
would be inconsistent with the determination that an embryo is
not a person.
Embryo donation heightens the ambiguous nature of the
embryo because it sets up a dichotomy between its characteris-
tics that tend toward property and those that tend toward per-
sonhood. On the one hand, the embryo is property in that it can
be destroyed, donated to science for experimentation, and
stored for indefinite periods of time. 134 On the other hand, it is
more like a person based on its biological uniqueness and po-
tential for human life135 and, in the case of embryo donation,
131. See, e.g., id. § 102(19) (suggesting that a manifestation of intent be re-
quired for recognition of the intended parent).
132. See Prato-Morrison v. Doe, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 516 (Ct. App. 2002)
("[H]ad the Morrisons presented proof of a genetic link to the twins sufficient
to establish their standing to pursue a parentage action, it would not be in the
best interests of the twins to have the Morrisons intrude into their lives. . . .").
133. See Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 788 n.6 (Ct. App.
2003) (concluding that Robert's actions were in line with the child's best inter-
ests).
134. See Katz, supra note 36, at 304 ("The progenitors have a number of
options .. . . They may use the embryos for attempts at a future pregnancy,
donate them to be used for research, give them to another couple . . . leave
them in cryostorage . .. or request that they be discarded.").
135. See Robertson, supra note 33, at 441 ("At this stage a new and unique
genome beginning a new generation exists .... .").
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the goal of the transaction is that a child be born.136 Recogniz-
ing intent creates a link between these competing interests.
Legally acknowledging the intended parents would create a le-
gal fiction of sorts that would allow the embryo to be treated as
something that it is not for the purpose of protecting what each
party intends for it to be.
B. SEVERING THE INTENDED-PARENT RELATIONSHIP
The intended-parent relationship must transfer from the
embryo's creators to the donees. Fertility clinics typically trans-
fer the embryo in one of two ways, either by a contract or
through embryo adoption. Considering the nature of the emb-
ryo, the ultimate goals of embryo donation, and the instability
of contracts, embryo adoption should be the legislated process
by which the intended-parent status is transferred. Adoption
provides clarity and finality to embryo transfer. Embryo adop-
tion, though currently practiced privately, mimics state adop-
tion, requiring home studies, parenting classes, and criminal
background checks. 137
Having both the donors and the donees go through the
adoption process creates a formalized agreement and imports
the significance of the transfer. It also communicates the finali-
ty of the transaction. Donees are more likely to be protected be-
cause of the significant amount of time and effort the adoption
process requires. Donors are less likely to dispute parentage
because they, in a manner similar to normal adoption, exert a
certain amount of control in choosing the donees. 138
A regulated embryo adoption system would also establish
uniformity in the embryo transfer process. Uniformity would
increase the likelihood of predictability. When litigation does
occur, courts would have a clear set of regulations applicable to
every case. Rules for the transfer of intent would be consistent
regardless of the parties or the fertility clinic used. It would
136. See Katz, supra note 36, at 303 (noting that in vitro fertilization ex-
ternalizes human conception).
137. See SPAR, supra note 17, at 92 (observing that one fertility clinic "ex-
plicitly subjects its prospective parents to the same procedures that govern
domestic infant adoption-a home study, parent training sessions, criminal
screening. . .").
138. See id. at 89-90 (noting that embryo donors may utilize a database of




provide the sort of guidance that courts often say artificial re-
production cases lack.139
Embryo adoption is also appropriate considering how easi-
ly it fits within the already established adoption system. The
rules and regulations that control adoptions are already in
place. 140 That embryo donation is still a relatively new practice
would aid a transition into an adoption system because there is
not yet a preset standard for the practice. Setting out clear
guidelines would also lend a greater sense of legitimacy to emb-
ryo donation, which could increase its use and help to decrease
the number of embryos currently frozen in storage.141 Adoption
also contemplates the fact that a child that will likely result
from embryo donation.142 A careful balance must be struck be-
tween recognizing that an embryo is not legally a person 43 and
respecting that the goal of embryo donation is to create a
child.144 Ultimately, society should invest in ensuring that the
child's best interests are maintained.
One alternative to an adoption system is reliance on pri-
vate contracts. Since contracts are privately negotiated, they do
not provide the structure needed for embryo donation regula-
tion. Parties can dispute the meaning of ambiguous contracts,
and contracts are not always enforced in the artificial reproduc-
tion context.145 For instance, in Belsito the court's ruling
aligned with the goal of the contract, but ultimately relied on
the intended parent's biological connection to the child that was
born using a surrogate.146 An adoption system eschews this po-
tentially litigious uncertainty.
139. See, e.g., In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 730 (Tenn. 2005) ("Given the
far-reaching, profoundly complex, and competing public policy considerations
necessarily implicated by the present controversy, we conclude that crafting a
general rule to adjudicate all controversies so implicated is more appropriately
accomplished by the Tennessee General Assembly.").
140. See, e.g., UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (1994), 9 U.L.A. pt. lA, at 2 (Supp.
2009) (noting that Vermont has enacted the Uniform Adoption Act).
141. See RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE & RAND HEALTH, supra note 28,
at 1 (reporting that over 400,000 embryos are currently frozen in storage).
142. See Katz, supra note 36, at 321 ("By naming the practice 'adoption,'
the implication arises that a baby is involved.").
143. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (declining
to grant the legal status of personhood to preembryos).
144. See Katz, supra note 36, at 303.
145. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1264 (N.J. 1988) (holding that the
surrogacy contract used was void because contrary to public policy).
146. See Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 58 (Ct. C.P. 1994)
("[Blecause Shelly Belsito and Anthony Belsito provided the child with its ge-
netics, they must be designated as the legal and natural parents.").
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C. ADDRESSING CRITICISMS OF RECOGNIZING INTENT AND
EMBRYO ADOPTION
An intent standard, on its own, does not seem to ease fears
that are typically associated with unregulated ART. In some
ways, it seems to simply trade one arbitrary and inconsistent
system for another. Embryo adoption also raises a fair amount
of political discord. 147 However, by combining an intent stan-
dard with embryo adoption, those criticisms have less validity.
First, intent coupled with embryo adoption protects against
ambiguity and unregulated adoption. As noted in Belsito, two
concerns associated with applying an intent standard are its
potential ambiguity and the creation of an unregulated adop-
tion system. 148 On its own, intent seems like a fairly relative
term. When determining parentage in assisted reproduction,
any party could say that he or she intended to be the child's
parent.149 Even if a contract is signed, a party could say that
the contract does not reflect his or her intent.150 Perhaps taken
to its logical extreme, a party could claim that the contract, de-
spite being accurate at one point, no longer expresses his or her
intent.15' By defining intent based on the manifest action of
creating an embryo and regulating the process that allows this
intent to transfer through adoption, intent becomes much less
ambiguous. It is attached to the action of creation and the
process of adoption.
The intent standard must be coupled with an embryo adop-
tion system in order to protect against unregulated adoption.
There are dangers associated with allowing unregulated ex-
change of genetic material beyond parties changing their minds
and pursuing parentage actions. Embryos could be bought and
sold on an open market. Fertility clinics could fraudulently
transfer embryos by telling one party the embryos were de-
stroyed and telling the receiving party that they had been vo-
147. See Katz, supra note 36, at 333-34.
148. See Belsito, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d at 61-62 (noting that the intent standard
is "difficult to prove" and at odds with public policy).
149. See id. at 62 ("[Wlho is the natural parent if both a nongenetic-
providing surrogate and the female genetic provider agree that they both in-
tend to procreate and raise a child?").
150. See id. ("It has long been recognized that, as a matter of public policy,
the state will not enforce or encourage private agreements or contracts to give
up parental rights.").
151. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1236 (N.J. 1988) (ruling on the en-
forceability of a surrogacy agreement signed by the surrogate who upon giving
birth did not want to give up the child).
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luntarily donated. Mistakes are more likely to happen without
regulation, even if no fraud is involved. A defined adoption
process would require clear action by both parties and set up a
system of checks and balances that would reassure both sides
of the adoption's legitimacy. The process could be removed from
fertility clinics altogether by sourcing out the process to adop-
tion agencies, further eliminating the risk of mistaken or frau-
dulent transfer.
Intent, on its own, poses a risk for unregulated adoption.
Recognizing anyone who "intends" to be a parent as a parent is
fairly arbitrary. Intent could be tied into buying and selling
embryos. Abusive situations could arise out of insufficient
background checks of intended parents. Intent itself could be
skewed by having inconsistent understandings of the transfer
of intent. Self-regulated clinics could arbitrarily honor the "in-
tent" of one couple against the wishes of another. However, by
vesting the status of intended parent in the embryo's creators
and regulating the process by which intent is transferred be-
tween parties, the risks associated with unregulated adoption
are decreased.
Second, embryo adoption does not affect the admittedly vo-
latile issues of abortion and other reproductive rights. Embryo
adoption is couched in the rhetoric that divides pro-life and pro-
choice activists. 152 Those who are pro-choice hesitate to graft
adoption, the process used for transferring parental rights, onto
the current system, which transfers what are currently unders-
tood as ownership rights, out of fear that the embryo's legal
status will become even more muddled.153 The ambiguous na-
ture of the embryo is a perceived threat against women's repro-
ductive rights and embryonic stem-cell research.154
Recognizing intent, however, changes the status of the
embryo owners rather than the embryo. Its ultimate goal is not
to restrict the embryo creators' or recipients' ability to decide
the disposition of the embryo, but rather to provide a system
where these rights are vested in the correct person. Since so
152. See Jaime E. Conde, Embryo Donation: The Government Adopts a
Cause, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 274 (2006) (discussing the Bush
administration's efforts to promote embryo adoption).
153. See id. at 280 (discussing embryo adoption).
154. See id. at 275 (noting that application of the "adoption concept" to




much of this controversy seems to be tied to rhetoric,155 a sim-
ple solution would be to continue to refer to the process as emb-
ryo donation. Rather than creating a new system, this would
simply regulate the current system. Even if applying the adop-
tion process infuses a greater sense of the embryo's humanness
than is legally applied in other reproductive situations, this is
not unprecedented. Current tort and property laws often treat
a human fetus as a person. 156 This legal distinction has not
eliminated the recognized individual right to abort a fetus. It
has not prevented scientists from destroying embryos through
experimentation or embryo creators from destroying their own
embryos. 15 7 Rather than require that all unused embryos be
adopted instead of destroyed or donated for scientific research,
donation is a process by which embryos may be transferred for
the purpose of allowing another person or persons to have
children.
D. REVISION OF THE UNIFORM LAWS SUGGESTED FOR STATE
ADOPTION
In recent years, suggested uniform legislation has begun to
address reproductive technology. Both the UPA, revised in
2002, and the 1VIAGART address issues of sperm and egg dona-
tion, as well as surrogacy.158 Both have also defined the in-
tended parent and used that definition to offer clearer guidance
155. See id. at 279-87 (discussing the emotionally charged nature of the
debate between "embryo adoption" and "embryo donation").
156. See Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Governmental Regulation
of Pregnant Women's Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 186-87
(1989) (discussing the development and current implementation of tort and
probate laws that recognize the rights of a fetus for the purpose of protecting
the interest of the mother or parents).
157. Compare id. (recognizing the legal fiction of treating a fetus as a per-
son in certain legal contexts), with Katz, supra note 36, at 304, 325 (observing
that abortion jurisprudence, which does not recognize the personhood of em-
bryos, does not interfere with the options available to embryo creators for dis-
posing of or destroying their unused embryos).
158. See generally MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH.
§§ 701-809 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/
artmodelact.pdf (discussing assisted reproduction and surrogacy agreements);
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 701-809 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 354-70 (2001)
(discussing assisted reproduction and surrogacy agreements); see also id.
§§ 701-809, 9B U.L.A. 61-77 (Supp. 2009) (amending the 2000 version of the




on surrogacy practices.159 However, neither set of suggested
legislation addresses parentage issues in embryo donation. This
is unfortunate considering that the definition of intended par-
ent could easily be worded to include anyone who controls the
disposition of an embryo. Uniform legislation should also clarify
that intent is established through the creation of an embryo,
regardless of the genetic material. Lastly, uniform laws should
outline the process for transferring intent between parties. A
regulatory system based on the adoption system already estab-
lished in the state should be imposed on embryo donation.
CONCLUSION
Embryo donation is still a new practice and, in many ways,
its flaws have yet to reveal themselves. Yet based on the paren-
tage issues that have surfaced as well as the parallel parentage
issues in the more established practice of surrogacy, there ex-
ists a need to institute regulations that establish clear
processes for determining and protecting the parentage of
children born through embryo adoption. Since neither of the
donees are genetically related to the embryo and at most only
one party is able to give birth to the embryo, intent is the best
method for establishing parentage. But because intent itself is
ambiguous, legislation should define intent by its manifestation
in creating an embryo.
In order to apply this intent standard to embryo donation,
a process by which intent can be transferred must also be es-
tablished. Currently this process either takes place through
contract or a process that imitates adoption. Contracts lead to
the same ambiguity and indeterminate issues that are ulti-
mately the problem in this context. In comparison, the formali-
ty and uniformity of embryo adoption could bring a sense of
clarity, finality, and predictability that will reduce the risk of
parentage issues. Embryo adoption ultimately protects the goal
of embryo donation: to transfer the embryo to another party for
the purpose of bearing a child. Proposed uniform legislation
should provide states with definitions of "intent" and "intended
159. See MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(19)
(2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf
(discussing assisted reproduction and surrogacy agreements); UNIF. PAREN-
TAGE ACT § 102(12) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 304 (2001) (defining intended
parent). But see id. § 102, 9B U.L.A. 11-12 (Supp. 2009) (amending the Uni-
form Parentage Act to omit the definition of "intended parent," although the
term does appear in § 801(a)(3) of the amended version of the UPA).
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parent" that are applicable both to surrogacy and embryo dona-
tion by establishing intent at the time the embryo is created.
Additionally, uniform legislation should address embryo dona-
tion by outlining a process similar to adoption that transfers
the intended parent status from the donors to the donees.
This solution is a preemptive measure. The hope is to pre-
vent litigation as to parentage for people who participate in
embryo donation by regulating the embryo donation process
and removing it from the control of the ART market. In both
Prato-Morrison and Robert B., parentage issues arose out of
underlying fertility clinic abuses.160 Though legislation that
prescribes an adoption-like process for embryo donation may
not prevent all abuse, it adds an extra layer of protection to its
participants. It is unlikely that the couples who received em-
bryos in either Prato-Morrison or Robert B. intended to "steal"
another couple's embryo. By implementing an adoption system
for embryo donation, all of the parties involved would have
been aware of what was happening. The receiving couples
would have received embryos from parties who wanted their
embryos to be given to someone else, and the donating parties
would not have been forced into their donation. The dynamic
nature of ART creates both opportunity and controversy; ulti-
mately, regulation must embrace the challenge of formulating
solutions to its problems while still maintaining its usefulness
and respecting its growing importance in today's society.
160. See Prato-Morrison v. Doe, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 510 (Ct. App. 2002);
Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 786 (Ct. App. 2003).
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